The enduring practice of proxy war allows major powers to pursue strategic interests in intrastate conflicts without the burdens of direct military engagement. These campaigns, however, can result in massive civilian suffering and create lasting instability in the host states. They also expose the limits of the indirect approach as proxies almost invariably pursue their own interests and impulses, leading to political chaos and economic dislocation, famine, and displacement.
Despite the risks, major powers are likely to continue to use proxies in intrastate conflicts, especially those involving regional rivals. For example, Russia and the United States each backed opposing factions in the Syrian conflict. Such conflicts often draw in global powers and exacerbate the chaos by creating competing claims to territory, influence, and power.
To mitigate the inherent problems of proxy warfare, the intervening state must be able to control the actions of its proxy. This requires a deep understanding of the proxies, including their capabilities, political ambitions, and motivations. Policy makers should consider the extent to which their objectives converge and diverge with those of the proxy, as well as how these factors evolve over time.
An intervening state should limit its objectives when the available proxy lacks the capability to win a war. In such cases, extending the conflict can be more effective than trying to achieve tactical military victories. However, intervening states must be mindful of the consequences of a prolonged conflict, particularly in terms of weakened governance structures and ongoing cycles of violence that devastate local populations.